
Judging by the commentary, there has been a colossal misunderstanding around the world of what has just has happened in Germany. The significance of yesterday’s vote by the Bundestag to make the EU’s €440bn rescue fund (EFSF) more flexible is not that the outcome was a "Yes".
This assent was a foregone conclusion, given the backing of the opposition Social Democrats and Greens. In any case, the vote merely ratifies the EU deal reached more than two months ago – itself too little, too late, rendered largely worthless by very fast-moving events.
The significance is entirely the opposite. The furious debate over the erosion of German fiscal sovereignty and democracy – as well as the escalating costs of the EU rescue machinery – has made it absolutely clear that the Bundestag will not prop up the ruins of monetary union for much longer.
Horst Seehofer, the leader of Bavaria’s Social Christians, said his party would go "this far, and no further".
There can be no question of beefing up the EFSF to €2 trillion or any other sum, whether by leverage or other forms of structured trickery. "The financial markets are beginning to ask whether Germans can afford all this help. We must not risk the creditworthiness of the German state," he said.
The best-read story in today’s Handelsblatt is the mounting rebellion against the EFSF in the Bundesrat, the German senate representing the interests of the regions. While this chamber does not have the power to block budget deals, it has begun to express deep alarm about the drift of events.
Marcel Huber, Bavaria’s Staatskanzleichef, gave an explicit warning that the Free State of Bavaria will not take one step further towards an EMU fiscal union or debt pool.
“A collectivisation of debts will under no circumstances be accepted. We oppose credit lines for the EFSF or leveraging through the ECB. Our message is simple and clear.”
Since the existing EFSF is too small to make any material difference to the EMU debt crisis, this means that nothing has in fact been resolved. We are where we started, almost entirely reliant on the ECB to play the role of lender-of-last resort.
Can it realistically play this role after the double resignation of Axel Weber at the Bundesbank and Jurgen Stark at the ECB itself over bond purchases? Can it defy Europe’s paymaster state for long? You decide.
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100012332/nein-nein-nein-and-the-death-of-eu-fiscal-union/